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TOTALITARIAN RANDOM TUG-OF-WAR GAMES IN GRAPHS
MARCOS ANTÓN, FERNANDO CHARRO*, AND PEIYONG WANG
Abstract. In this work we discuss a random Tug-of-War game in graphs
where one of the players has the power to decide at each turn whether to
play a round of classical random Tug-of-War, or let the other player choose
the new game position in exchange of a fixed payoff. We prove that this
game has a value using a discrete comparison principle and viscosity tools,
as well as probabilistic arguments. This game is related to Jensen’s extremal
equations, which have a key role in Jensen’s celebrated proof of uniqueness
of infinity harmonic functions.
1. Introduction
Random Tug-of-War games were introduced in [16] in connection with partial
differential equations (see also the survey [17]). Informally, random Tug-of-War
games play for the normalized infinity Laplacian the role that the Brownian motion
plays for the classical Laplacian. More precisely, for a regular function u, the
normalized infinity Laplacian is given by
∆N∞u(x) :=

〈
D2u(x) ∇u(x)|∇u(x)| ,
∇u(x)
|∇u(x)|
〉
, if ∇u(x) 6= 0;
limy→x
2(u(y)−u(x))
|y−x|2 , otherwise,
(1.1)
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product in Rn. Observe that (1.1) is the pure second
derivative of u in the direction of the gradient whenever ∇u(x) 6= 0, whereas
no direction is preferred at points where ∇u(x) = 0 and it is only required that
the limit exists. In our notation the superscript N stands for “normalized” to
emphasize the distinction between (1.1) and the standard infinity Laplacian (1.4).
1.1. Classical random Tug-of-War games. The classical random Tug-of-War
game (see [16]) is a two-person, zero-sum game, that is, two players are in contest
and the total earnings of one player are the losses of the other. Following [16],
random Tug-of-War games can be described in a very general way in terms of a set
X of states of the game, a non-empty set Y of terminal states, and an undirected
graph E with vertex set X ∪ Y that describes the possible move options for both
players at any game state.
The game starts with a token placed at x0 ∈ X\Y and is played by turns. At
each turn a fair coin is tossed and the winner of the toss is allowed to decide the
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next game position among all positions adjacent to the current one (in the graph
E). Whenever the game position reaches Y the game stops and Player I earns a
terminal payoff given by a function F : Y → R, known to both players beforehand
(notice that Player II’s earnings are given by −F ). Although we will not consider
it here, it is also possible to include a running payoff, i.e., payments that Player I
receives from Player II at each intermediate state of the game (see [16]). The sets
X and Y can be general metric spaces as in [16], however there are two particular
cases of special interest: the case when X is a graph (in this case Y ⊂ X and
E = X), and when X = Ω ⊂ Rn.
In [16] it was proved under very general assumptions that the classical random
Tug-of-War game has a value, that is, a function u(x) which represents the ex-
pected outcome of the game just described, starting at a point x ∈ X, when both
players play optimally. Moreover, the game value satisfies a functional equation
known as Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP)
u(x) =
1
2
(
sup
y∈{x}′
u(y) + inf
y∈{x}′
u(y)
)
for all x ∈ X,
where {x}′ denotes the set of neighbors in E of x ∈ X. In the particular case of
X = Ω ⊂ Rn, the players are allowed to move to any point in Ω within a distance
ε from x. The step size ε is known to both players beforehand. In this case the
DPP reads
uε(x) =
1
2
(
sup
y∈Bε(x)∩Ω
uε(y) + inf
y∈Bε(x)∩Ω
uε(y)
)
for all x ∈ Ω, (1.2)
where Bε(x) denotes the closed ball of radius ε and center x in Rn.
The key observation in [16] is that the DPP can be seen as a “discretization” of
the normalized infinity Laplacian. In other words, the limit u = limε→0 uε (known
as the continuous value of the game in the terminology of [16]) is a viscosity
solution of the Dirichlet problem for the normalized infinity Laplacian, that is,{
−∆N∞u(x) = 0, x ∈ Ω;
u(x) = F (x), x ∈ ∂Ω.
(1.3)
This is reminiscent of how the Dirichlet problem for the Laplace equation has a
probabilistic interpretation in terms of the Brownian motion. The main difference
is that all directions are equally probable for the Brownian motion, while the
random Tug-of-War considers only the directions of maximal and minimal growth.
1.2. An overview of the infinity Laplacian. The infinity Laplace operator
∆∞u(x) =
〈
D2u(x)∇u(x),∇u(x)
〉
(1.4)
and its normalized version (1.1) appear naturally in optimal transportation and
image processing (see, e.g., [6, 9]), as well as absolutely minimizing Lipschitz
extensions of a given Lipschitz function (see [17, Section 3]). The interested reader
can also check the survey [14] for a more comprehensive review of the applications
of the infinity Laplacian.
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A function u is infinity harmonic if and only if −∆∞u = 0 in the viscosity sense,
which is equivalent to−∆N∞u = 0 in the viscosity sense. Observe, however, that the
infinity Laplacian and the normalized infinity Laplacian are not interchangeable
for a general right-hand side f 6≡ 0.
Let us just mention that an equivalent characterization of infinity harmonic
functions can be based on the following asymptotic mean value formula
u(x) =
1
2
(
sup
y∈Bε(x)
u(y) + inf
y∈Bε(x)
u(y)
)
+ o(ε2) as ε→ 0 (1.5)
(see [14, Theorem 5.3]). In fact, a function u is infinity harmonic in Ω if and only
if u ∈ C(Ω) and the mean value formula (1.5) holds in Ω in the viscosity sense.
Remark 1.1. It is worth comparing (1.2) and (1.5). Functions satisfying (1.2)
are called harmonious functions in [13] and are values of classical random Tug-of-
War games. As mentioned before, they approximate solutions to the ∞-Laplace
equation (1.3) as ε → 0 (see [16]), which satisfy (1.5) in the viscosity sense (see
[14, Theorem 5.3]).
The natural framework to study the infinity Laplacian is the framework of
viscosity solutions; it turns out that one can prescribe smooth boundary values
that no C2 solution of −∆∞u = 0 can attain. This was proved by Aronsson [1]
in the two-dimensional case and by Yu [21] in higher dimensions. Moreover, the
fact that the operator is not in divergence form, does not allow us to integrate by
parts and define a notion of weak solution.
Moreover, a classical solution of −∆∞u = 0 is a viscosity solution but the
converse is not true in general. An important example is the function
u(x, y) = x4/3 − y4/3,
which is infinity harmonic in the viscosity sense but not in the classical one. In
fact, this particular function has regularity C1,1/3 (see [4] for more details). The
regularity of infinity harmonic functions turns out to be a very tough question
(see comments on [5, Section 3], [19, Section 6], [20, Section 1.5 and 1.8]). Ac-
cording to [8], infinity harmonic functions are differentiable everywhere, while C1
or C1,α regularity are known to hold in dimension two after the breakthroughs of
[7] and [18]. It remains an open problem to prove C1 or C1,α regularity in general
dimensions.
As the nomenclature “infinity Laplacian” suggests, the infinity Laplace equa-
tion, −∆∞u = 0, is a limit as p → ∞ of the p-Laplace equation, −∆pu = 0 (see
for instance [3]). However, the case of the so-called “infinity Poisson equation”
−∆∞u(x) = f(x) is more complex since, in general, it is not the limit as p→∞ of
the corresponding p-Poisson equation −∆pu = f . For instance, in the case f ≡ 1
the correct limit equation turns out to be
min {|∇u(x)| − 1,−∆∞u(x)} = 0 (1.6)
(see [3, 12, 14]). Equation (1.6) is a particular case of Jensen’s extremal equations
min {|∇u(x)| − λ,−∆∞u(x)} = 0 (1.7)
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and
max {λ− |∇u(x)|,−∆∞u(x)} = 0, (1.8)
for λ > 0, known to have a key role in Jensen’s celebrated proof of uniqueness of
infinity harmonic functions (see [10]). Notice that for every λ > 0 we have
min
{
|∇u| − λ,−∆N∞u
}
= 0 ⇐⇒ min {|∇u| − λ,−∆∞u} = 0
in the viscosity sense, and similarly for (1.8).
1.3. The Totalitarian random Tug-of-War. We introduce a new game, which
we call Totalitarian random Tug-of-War, or simply Totalitarian Tug-of-War that
is related to Jensen’s extremal equations (1.7) and (1.8). Even if we will focus our
attention on the game played on a graph, the relation between Jensen’s extremal
equations and the Totalitarian Tug-of-War played in Ω ⊂ Rn will be clarified in
Section 4. For simplicity let us focus on equation (1.6), since the general case can
be then obtained through simple modifications that we will describe below.
The Totalitarian Tug-of-War is a variant of a classical random Tug-of-War game
in which one of the players is given extra options. More precisely, the game is
played by turns starting with a token placed at a node x0. At each turn, Player I
has the power to decide whether to play a round of classical random Tug-of-War
(that is, they toss a coin and the winner decides the new game position among
the neighbors of the current one), or force Player II choose the new game position
among the neighbors of the current one in exchange of a fixed payoff of value ε.
The fact that Player I somehow imposes at each turn the type of game that is
played, is the reason why we refer to this game as Totalitarian Tug-of-War. The
game ends the first time the token reaches a terminal state xτ , and the payoff
Player I receives from Player II is Fτ + kτ ε (the game is a two-person, zero-sum
game). Fτ corresponds to the terminal payoff at x
τ and kτ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , τ} is a
positive integer that represents the number of times Player I has let Player II
decide the next move in exchange of an ε-payoff throughout the game.
Just as in the classical random Tug-of-War game, Player I wants to maximize
the final payoff that receives from Player II, who in turn wants to minimize it
(and maximize his/her own). In order to attain this objective, the players follow
strategies according to which they take a particular action at each turn. Note that
all terminal payoffs and the value ε are known to both players beforehand and that
players are assumed to play optimally.
When the Totalitarian Tug-of-War is played in Ω ⊂ Rn the payment that Player
I receives from Player II when the latter is forced to choose the new game position
is proportional to the step size of the classical Tug-of-War game. Denoting the
proportionality constant by λ, we recover (1.7) in the limit as ε → 0 (see Section
4). Moreover, considering a Totalitarian Tug-of-War which favors Player II instead
of Player I, we can treat (1.8). See Section 4 for more details.
Let us devote the rest of the introduction to describing our main results in this
work along with some key notions that will be used throughout. The first one is
the notion of (pure) strategy of a player. A pure strategy for player α, denoted
Sα = {Skα}k, is a sequence of mappings from histories Hk to actions ak. The
history up to stage k is the sequence of game positions and actions up to the k-th
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turn of the game, written as Hk = (x0, a0, x1, a1, . . . , ak−1, xk), where xi stands
for the game position at the i-th turn and ai means the action carried out by the
player who moved in this turn from position xi. Roughly speaking, at every turn
the strategy indicates the player’s next move, provided such player is given the
choice, as a function of the current game position and past history. In other words,
the strategy of a player says what action to take at each running node of the game,
but it depends on the evolution of the game that these actions are accomplished
or not. More information about the general notion of strategy can be found in [17,
Section 3.1]. For some games, such as the classical random Tug-of-War and the
Totalitarian Tug-of-War, the action of a player at a given node is independent of
both the stage of the game where the decision is made and the history up to that
stage.
For a game that starts at position x, where Players I and II adopt strategies
SI and SII respectively, the expected payoff that Player I receives from Player II
is denoted by ExSI ,SII [Fτ + kτ ε], where Fτ is the payoff associated to the terminal
position xτ . On the contrary, there may be games for which the players can choose
strategies so that the game does not end almost surely. In order to penalize these
strategies, the payoff that each player receives from the other is defined to be the
worst possible, that is, −∞ in the case of Player I and +∞ for Player II. More
precisely, the expected payoff that Player I receives from Player II is defined as
V xSI ,SII (I) :=
{
ExSI ,SII [Fτ + kτ ε], if the game ends almost surely;
−∞, otherwise,
(1.9)
where ExiSI ,SII [Fτ +kτ ε] represents the expected payoff that Player I receives from
Player II when they follow strategies SI and SII respectively and the game starts
at the node xi. Analogously, the expected payoff that Player II has to pay Player
I is defined as
V xSI ,SII (II) :=
{
ExSI ,SII [Fτ + kτ ε], if the game ends almost surely;
+∞, otherwise.
(1.10)
Note that V xSI ,SII (I), V
x
SI ,SII
(II) defined in (1.9) and (1.10) respectively, can be
used to assign a value to the Totalitarian Tug-of-War game in the same way as
in the classical random Tug-of-War, the only difference being that in the latter
case kτ is absent from the definitions of V
x
SI ,SII
(I), V xSI ,SII (II). More precisely,
the value of the game for Player I when the game starts at x, is defined as
uI(x) := sup
SI
inf
SII
V xSI ,SII (I), (1.11)
and the value of the game for Player II when the game starts at x, as
uII(x) := inf
SII
sup
SI
V xSI ,SII (II). (1.12)
Observe that both uI and uII represent the worst possible expected payoffs for
players I and II respectively, or in other words, uI and uII are, respectively, the
smallest and largest payoffs that Player I expects to receive from Player II. By
definition, uI ≤ uII . Similarly to the classical random Tug-of-War game, we say
that the Totalitarian Tug-of-War game has a value when uI = uII .
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In the sequel we will refer to the Totalitarian Tug-of-War game played on graphs
as the discrete Totalitarian Tug-of-War. In Section 2 we prove that the discrete
Totalitarian Tug-of-War has a value. A key point in the proof of this result is that
both uI and uII , as well as the value of the game solve a Dynamic Programming
Principle, obtained considering the two possible choices for Player I and then
applying conditional probabilities for the coin toss. In the case of a graph, the
aforementioned DPP is, for all interior nodes xi,
ui = max
{
min
j∈{i′}
uj + ε,
1
2
(
max
j∈{i′}
uj + min
j∈{i′}
uj
)}
, (1.13)
where ui = u(xi) and {i′} denotes the finite set of indices associated to the nodal
neighbors xi′ of xi in the graph.
We prove that the game has a value by means of a discrete comparison principle
for the DPP, proved in Section 2. The precise result is the following.
Theorem 1.2. Let N (nodes) be the finite set of game position indices and I
the set of indices for the interior (running) nodes of the game. Let u and v be
respectively a subsolution and supersolution of
min
{
ui − min
j∈{i′}
uj − ε, ui −
1
2
(
max
j∈{i′}
uj + min
j∈{i′}
uj
)}
= 0,
i.e., Gi[u] ≤ 0 ≤ Gi[v] for all i ∈ I, where
Gi[u] := min
{
ui − min
j∈{i′}
uj − ε, ui −
1
2
(
max
j∈{i′}
uj + min
j∈{i′}
uj
)}
.
Assume also that vi is bounded from above for all i ∈ N and from below for all
i ∈ N\I, and ui ≤ vi for all i ∈ N\I. Then ui ≤ vi for all i ∈ N .
The proof of this discrete comparison principle is based on a change of variables
that allows to produce strict supersolutions of the DPP from mere supersolutions
and is inspired by the proof of the comparison principle for equation (1.6) in [11].
As a consequence, we have the following result.
Theorem 1.3. The discrete Totalitarian Tug-of-War game has a value, which is
unique.
Section 3 contains explicit examples of Totalitarian Tug-of-War game on star-
shaped graphs, with an exhaustive analysis of the graph-segment case. We rely
on the fact that the value of the game exists and is the unique solution of the
DPP, as proved in Section 2. In this way, we can identify candidates to optimal
strategies by direct inspection and it suffices to check that they satisfy the DPP.
Finally, in Section 4 we clarify the relation between Jensen’s extremal equations
and the Totalitarian Tug-of-War played in Ω ⊂ Rn.
2. A Discrete Comparison Principle: The Totalitarian
Tug-of-War in Graphs Has a Value
We refer to the Totalitarian Tug-of-War game played on graphs as the discrete
Totalitarian Tug-of-War. For notational simplicity, we will consider here the case
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where the graph is a segment; however, the general case follows with the same
ideas. We will denote by N (nodes) the finite set of game position indices and I
(interior nodes) the set of indices for the running nodes of the game.
The DPP associated to the discrete Totalitarian Tug-of-War in a discrete graph
segment, corresponds to
ui = max
{
min {ui−1, ui+1}+ ε,
1
2
(ui−1 + ui+1)
}
for all i ∈ I,
where ui stands for the expected value of the game on the node xi (compare with
(1.13)). Note that this DPP can be equivalently written as
min
{
ui −min {ui−1, ui+1} − ε, ui −
1
2
(ui−1 + ui+1)
}
= 0 (2.1)
for all i ∈ I. For convenience, we will rewrite (2.1) as Gi[u] = 0, where u =
(u0, . . . , un+1) and
Gi[u] := min
{
ui −min {ui−1, ui+1} − ε, ui −
1
2
(ui−1 + ui+1)
}
for all i ∈ I. The combination of the DPP with the terminal payoff, gives us the
following Dirichlet problem associated to the discrete Totalitarian Tug-of-War{
Gi[u] = 0, i ∈ I;
ui = Fi, i ∈ N\I.
(2.2)
Considering the two possible choices for Player I and then applying conditional
probabilities for the coin toss, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2.1. The value functions of the game for Players I and II, uIi and
uIIi respectively, are both solutions to the discrete Dirichlet problem (2.2).
The importance of Proposition 2.1 lies on the fact that it allows us to apply
PDE methods to study uIi and u
II
i . In particular, we prove a discrete comparison
principle, Theorem 1.2, that allows us to prove that (2.2) has a unique solution
and therefore conclude that the game has a value.
The following lemma is necessary for the proof of Theorem 1.2. In the lemma,
we produce a strict supersolution of the DPP from a mere supersolution by means
of a change of variables. Moreover, the new strict supersolution thus produced is
arbitrarily close to the original supersolution.
Lemma 2.2. Let v be a supersolution to Gi[v] = 0, bounded from above for all
i ∈ N and from below for all i ∈ N\I. Then, for every γ > 0 there exists a
supersolution ṽ to the equation Gi[ṽ] = µ for some constant µ = µ(γ, v) > 0.
Moreover, ṽi − vi ≤ γ for all i ∈ N and ṽi − vi ≥ −γ for all i ∈ N\I.
Proof. We look for ṽ of the form ṽi = g(vi) for all i ∈ I, where
g(α) = (1 + ε)α− ε
4C
α2
for ε > 0 and C = maxi∈I |vi| (recall that v is bounded from above by hypothesis).
The constant γ in the statement of the lemma will be chosen later as a function
of ε.
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We assume, without loss of generality, that max{vi−vi−1, vi−vi+1} = vi−vi−1.
Note also that max{vi− vi−1, vi− vi+1} ≥ ε, in view of (2.1). According to these,
max{ṽi − ṽi−1, ṽi − ṽi+1} − ε = max{g(vi)− g(vi−1), g(vi)− g(vi+1)} − ε
= max
{
(1 + ε) (vi − vi−1)−
ε
4C
(v2i − v2i−1),
(1 + ε) (vi − vi+1)−
ε
4C
(v2i − v2i+1)
}
− ε
= max
{(
(1 + ε)− ε
4C
(vi + vi−1)
)
(vi − vi−1),(
(1 + ε)− ε
4C
(vi + vi+1)
)
(vi − vi+1)
}
− ε
≥
(
(1 + ε)− ε
4C
2C
)
(vi − vi−1)− ε
=
(
1 +
ε
2
)
(vi − vi−1)− ε ≥
(
1 +
ε
2
)
ε− ε = ε
2
ε.
On the other hand,
(ṽi − ṽi−1) + (ṽi − ṽi+1) = (g(vi)− g(vi−1)) + (g(vi)− g(vi+1))
= (1 + ε) ((vi − vi−1) + (vi − vi+1))−
ε
4C
(
v2i − v2i−1
)
− ε
4C
(
v2i − v2i+1
)
= (1 + ε) (2vi − vi−1 − vi+1) +
ε
4C
(
−2v2i + v2i−1 + v2i+1
)
.
Note that
− 2v2i + v2i−1 + v2i+1 = −2v2i + v2i−1 + v2i+1 ±
(
2v2i + 2vi vi−1 + 2vi vi+1
)
= −4v2i + (vi−1 − vi)2 + (vi+1 − vi)2 + 2vi vi−1 + 2vi vi+1
= −2vi (2vi − vi−1 − vi+1) + (vi−1 − vi)2 + (vi+1 − vi)2.
From these, it follows that
(ṽi − ṽi−1) + (ṽi − ṽi+1) = (1 + ε) (2vi − vi−1 − vi+1)
+
ε
4C
(
−2vi (2vi − vi−1 − vi+1) + (vi−1 − vi)2 + (vi+1 − vi)2
)
=
(
1 + ε− ε vi
2C
)
(2vi − vi−1 − vi+1) +
ε
4C
(
(vi−1 − vi)2 + (vi+1 − vi)2
)
≥
(
1 + ε− ε vi
2C
)
(2vi − vi−1 − vi+1) +
ε
4C
(max{vi − vi−1, vi − vi+1})2
≥ ε
4C
ε2,
where in the last inequality we have used that, since Gi[v] ≥ 0 by hypothesis for
all i ∈ I, 2vi − vi−1 − vi+1 ≥ 0 and max{vi − vi−1, vi − vi+1} ≥ ε.
Then, we get that
min
{
ṽi + max {−ṽi−1,−ṽi+1} − ε, ṽi −
1
2
(ṽi−1 + ṽi+1)
}
≥ min
{ε
2
ε,
ε
8C
ε2
}
=
ε
2
ε min
{
1,
ε
4C
}
= µ
for all i ∈ I, where µ = µ(ε, v) > 0.
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About the second part of this lemma, since g(α) − α ≤ 34 εC for α ≤ C and
because ṽi = g(vi), it follows that ṽi − vi ≤ 34 εC for all i ∈ N . Similarly,
since g(α) − α ≥ −εD
(
1 + D4C
)
for α ≥ −D = −
∣∣mini∈N\I vi∣∣, it follows that
ṽi − vi ≥ −εD
(
1 + D4C
)
for all i ∈ N\I. The result holds taking
γ = εmax
{
3
4
C, D
(
1 +
D
4C
)}
> 0,
provided ε is small enough. 
We proceed now with the proof of the discrete comparison principle, Theorem
1.2, inspired by the proof of the comparison principle for equation (1.6) in [11].
Proof of Theorem 1.2. Arguing by contradiction, we suppose that maxi∈N (ui −
vi) > 0. Since ui ≤ vi for all i ∈ N\I, it follows that there is an index j ∈ I
such that uj − vj = maxi∈N (ui − vi) > 0. On the other hand, by Lemma 2.2,
for every γ > 0 there exists ṽ such that ṽi − vi ≤ γ for all i ∈ N . As a result,
uj − vj > γ ≥ ṽj − vj for γ small enough and therefore uj > ṽj .
This implies that there is an index k ∈ N such that uk−ṽk = maxi∈N (uk−ṽk) >
0. In fact, k ∈ I since by Lemma 2.2, we can assume ṽi− vi ≥ −γ for all i ∈ N\I
and therefore uk − ṽk > γ ≥ vi − ṽi ≥ ui − ṽi for all i ∈ N\I. For the sake of
simplicity let us assume this index k to be the same j as before. It follows by
definition that
uj − ṽj ≥ ui − ṽi for all i ∈ N .
In particular uj − uj−1 ≥ ṽj − ṽj−1 and uj − uj+1 ≥ ṽj − ṽj+1. According to this
and writing (2.1) as
min {max {ui − ui−1, ui − ui+1} − ε, (ui − ui−1) + (ui − ui+1)} = 0,
we have that Gj [ṽ] ≤ Gj [u], a contradiction with the fact that Gi[u] ≤ 0 < Gi[ṽ]
for all i ∈ I by Lemma 2.2. 
An important consequence of Theorem 1.2 is the following bound.
Corollary 2.3. Let ui be a solution to the Dirichlet problem (2.2) and let Fi be
bounded for all i ∈ N\I. Then, for all i ∈ N and K = maxi∈N\I |Fi|,
εmin{(n+ 1)− i, i} −K ≤ ui ≤ εmin{(n+ 1)− i, i}+K.
Proof. Consider, for Fi the same in (2.2), the Dirichlet problem{
Gi[v] = 0, i ∈ I;
vi = K, i ∈ N\I,
a solution of which is vi = εmin{(n+ 1)− i, i}+K. Then, since it is bounded for
all i ∈ N , by Theorem 1.2 it follows that ui ≤ vi for all i ∈ N and therefore the
upper bound for ui is proved.
About the lower bound of ui, consider now the Dirichlet problem{
Gi[v] = 0, i ∈ I;
vi = −K, i ∈ N\I,
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x0 x1 x2 xn−1 xn xn+1
Figure 1. Game positions of the game on a segment with mul-
tiple running nodes.
a solution of which is vi = εmin{(n+1)− i, i}−K. On the other hand, since ui is
a solution to (2.2) by hypothesis, it is in particular a supersolution and bounded
from above due to the first part of the proof. Then, by Theorem 1.2 it follows that
vi ≤ ui for all i ∈ N and the proof is finished. 
In order to prove that the discrete Totalitarian Tug-of-War game has a value,
i.e., uIi = u
II
i for all i ∈ N , it will be enough to show that uIIi ≤ uIi holds for all
i ∈ N , since the converse holds by definition.
Proof of Theorem 1.3. Let uIi , u
II
i be the respective value of the Totalitarian Tug-
of-War game for Players I and II, for i ∈ N . By Proposition 2.1, both uIi and
uIIi are solutions to the discrete Dirichlet problem (2.2) and hence, according to
Corollary 2.3 they are bounded for all i ∈ N . In particular, they are respectively a
supersolution and subsolution of (2.1) for all i ∈ N and uIIi ≤ uIi for all i ∈ N\I.
Thus, we can apply Theorem 1.2 for ui = u
II
i and vi = u
I
i , so that u
II
i ≤ uIi for all
i ∈ N . On the other hand, by definition, uIi ≤ uIIi for all i ∈ N . It then follows
that uIIi = u
I
i for all i ∈ N so that the discrete Totalitarian Tug-of-War game has
a unique value. 
It is worth mentioning here that a more exhaustive discussion of discretized
degenerate elliptic equations and its applications to numerical analysis can be
found in [15], for instance.
3. Examples
This section is devoted to presenting explicit examples of the Totalitarian Tug-
of-War on graphs. Here, we rely on the fact that the value of the game exists
and is the unique solution of the DPP, as we proved in Section 2. In this way, we
can identify candidates to optimal strategies by direct inspection and it suffices to
check if the corresponding expected value satisfies the DPP.
3.1. Game on a graph segment. In this section we analyze in detail the To-
talitarian Tug-of-War game played on a graph segment with n running nodes, see
Figure 1. Recall that the values of ε, F0 and Fn+1 are fixed and known to both
players beforehand, and the final payoffs are independent of the ε-payments that
took place throughout the game. Notice that we can assume F0 ≤ Fn+1 due to
the symmetry of the graph.
The main result in this section is the following theorem, that describes the value
of the game and strategies that realize it for any given Fn+1, F0 and ε.
Theorem 3.1. Consider a Totalitarian Tug-of-War with parameter ε played on
a graph segment with n running nodes x0, x1, . . . , xn, xn+1, n ≥ 2. Let F0 and
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Fn+1 be the terminal payoffs at x0 and xn+1 respectively, which we can assume
F0 ≤ Fn+1. Define the quantity
Q =
Fn+1 − F0
ε
≥ 0.
Then, the value of the game and strategies that realize it can be described exhaus-
tively in terms of Q as follows:
(a) If Q > n+ 1 then the value of the game is given by
ui =
(
n+ 1− i
n+ 1
)
F0 +
i
n+ 1
Fn+1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
In this case the value of the game is realized when the players play a clas-
sical random Tug-of-War, that is, Player I’s strategy is to always move
towards xn+1 and Player II’s strategy is to always move towards x0.
(b) If n− 1 < Q ≤ n+ 1 then
ui = F0 + i ε, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
In this case the value of the game is realized when Player I always lets
Player II decide the next move, who moves towards the terminal node x0.
Moreover, if Q = n+ 1 there is a family of pairs of strategies that yield
the same value of the game. This family includes the pair of strategies just
mentioned as a particular case, and it can be described as follows: For
each fixed integer j ∈ [0, n] Player I lets Player II decide the next move at
the nodes xi with 1 ≤ i ≤ j, who moves towards the terminal node x0, and
Players I and II play a classical random Tug-of-War at the nodes xi with
j + 1 ≤ i ≤ n (Players I and II move towards xn+1 and x0 respectively).
(c) If there exists an integer k ∈ [1, n−1] such that 2k−n−1 < Q ≤ 2k−n+1,
then
ui =
{
F0 + i ε, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k;
Fn+1 + (n+ 1− i) ε, for k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
In this case the value of the game is realized when Player I always lets
Player II decide the next move, who moves towards the terminal node x0
at the nodes xi with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and towards xn+1 at the nodes xi with
k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Moreover, if Q = 2k − n + 1 there is a family of pairs of strategies
that yield the same value of the game. This family includes the pair of
strategies just mentioned as a particular case, and it can be described as
follows: For each fixed integer j ∈ [0, n− 2],
– Player I lets Player II decide the next move at the nodes xi with
1 ≤ i ≤ j, who moves towards the terminal node x0.
– Players I and II play a classical random Tug-of-War at the nodes xi
with j + 1 ≤ i ≤ k ≤ n− 1 (Players I and II move towards xn+1 and
x0 respectively).
– Player I lets Player II decide the next move at the nodes xi with
k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n, who moves towards the terminal node xn+1.
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Remark 3.2. Note that in the case Q > 0, as ε→ 0 we end up on the first situation,
so the limit is, naturally, a classical random Tug-of-War.
Remark 3.3. The case Q = 0, that is, when F0 = Fn+1, corresponds to case (c)
taking k = (n− 1)/2 or k = n/2, depending on the parity of n.
Let us start the proof of Theorem 3.1 by examining heuristically the choices
available to both players that motivate the analysis below. On the one hand, at any
given running node, Player I has three options: to move towards x0, towards xn+1,
or to let Player II decide. Moving towards x0 is not reasonable, since F0 ≤ Fn+1
implies that the new game position chosen by Player I would actually be more
favorable to Player II. In fact, Player I would reach the same position and receive
an ε-payoff by having Player II decide next move.
On the other hand, Player II has two options: to move towards x0 or towards
xn+1. In principle, moving towards xn+1 (the terminal node with largest terminal
payoff) seems against Player II’s interest. However, there can be situations where
it may be preferable for Player II to minimize the damage and avoid ε-payments
by ending the game at xn+1 as quickly as possible.
This heuristic reasoning yields three regions in the segment according to both
player’s choices, which can be described in terms of two indices j1 ≤ n, j2 ≥ 1
such that j1 < j2 as follows:
(1) At the nodes xi, for 0 ≤ i ≤ j1, Player I allows Player II to move, who
moves towards the terminal node x0;
(2) At the nodes xi, for j1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ j2 − 1, Players I and II play classical
random Tug-of-War, where the players want to move towards the terminal
nodes xn+1 and x0, respectively;
(3) At the nodes xi, for j2 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1, Player I allows Player II to move, who
moves towards the terminal node xn+1.
In fact, we are going to see that the expected value of the game at each position
can be completely determined by looking only at pairs of strategies of the form just
described, since these include all the reasonable ones. “Unreasonable” strategies
include playing classical random Tug-of-War with the players switching their roles,
or playing classical random Tug-of-War when both players want to move towards
the same terminal node, in which case Player I would do better by changing
strategy and forcing Player II to choose the next move.
One could argue if Player I would be able to get a higher expected payoff by
choosing a strategy other than allowing Player II to decide the next move in every
node 0 ≤ i ≤ j1 and j2 ≤ i ≤ n+1. The answer is negative, and this is the content
of the following extremal results, Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5.
In Lemma 3.4 we prove that, as long as Player II’s strategy is to move towards
x0 at every xi with 1 ≤ i ≤ j1 and Player I’s strategy implies letting Player II
decide the next move at xj1 , the expected value of the game at every node xi with
1 ≤ i ≤ j1 − 1 is independent of the action chosen by Player I at those game
positions.
Lemma 3.4. Let 1 ≤ j1 ≤ n and let SI , SII be any pair of strategies such that
Player I allows Player II to move at node xj1 , while Player II moves towards the
terminal node x0 for all xj with 1 ≤ j ≤ j1. Then, uk = F0 +k ε for all 0 ≤ k ≤ j1.
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y0
xk
y1
xk+1
yj1−k−1
xj1−1
yj1−k
xj1
yn−k+1
xn+1
Figure 2. Game positions after relabeling the original nodes xi
as yi−k, for k ≤ i ≤ n+ 1.
Proof. We argue by strong mathematical induction. Let Pi be the property stated
in the lemma, that is:
Pi : “For any pair of strategies SI , SII such that Player I allows Player II to
move at xi while Player II moves towards the terminal node x0 at all xj with
1 ≤ j ≤ i, we have that uk = F0 + k ε for all 0 ≤ k ≤ i”.
Assume Pi holds for all 0 ≤ i ≤ j1 − 1. We want to prove that Pj1 is also
true. There are two possible situations in terms of Player I’s strategy at the game
positions xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ j1 − 1.
On the one hand, suppose that Player I allows Player II to move at node xk for
some 1 ≤ k ≤ j1 − 1. Then, since Pk is true by the strong induction hypothesis,
the value of the game at the nodes xj for 0 ≤ j ≤ k, is uj = F0 + j ε. We can
relabel the remaining nodes as yj = xj+k, for 0 ≤ j ≤ n+ 1 (see Figure 2) so that
the original node xk is now a terminal node with associated payoff F0 + k ε. By
the strong induction hypothesis, Pj1−k holds and therefore the expected value of
the game at yj = xj+k for 0 ≤ j ≤ j1− k, is uj = F0 + (k+ j) ε, so Pj1 holds true.
On the other hand, the opposite situation is also possible, i.e., that Player I
does not allow Player II to choose the next move at any node xj for 1 ≤ j < j1. In
this case, Player I will necessarily choose to move towards xn+1 (since otherwise
it would be more advantageous to let Player II decide next move and collect an ε
payoff). Therefore, the players play classical random Tug-of-War in the nodes xi
for 1 ≤ i ≤ j1 − 1 and we can compute uj1 by solving the linear system
u0 = F0;
ui =
1
2 (ui−1 + ui+1), for 1 ≤ i ≤ j1 − 1;
uj1 = uj1−1 + ε.
Thus, we obtain ui = F0 + i ε for 0 ≤ i ≤ j1, which concludes the proof. 
In a similar way, the expected value of the game at every node xi with j2 + 1 ≤
i ≤ n is independent of the action chosen by Player I at those game positions, as
long as Player II’s strategy is to move towards xn+1 at every xi with j2 ≤ i ≤ n
and Player I’s strategy implies letting Player II decide the next move at xj2 . This
result follows from Lemma 3.4 and is collected in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5. Let 1 ≤ j2 ≤ n and let SI , SII be any pair of strategies such that
Player I allows Player II to move at node xj2 , while Player II moves towards the
terminal node xn+1 for all xj with j2 ≤ j ≤ n. Then, uk = Fn+1 + (n + 1 − k) ε
for all j2 ≤ k ≤ n+ 1.
With the previous considerations, the computation of the expected payoff for
each pair of strategies SI , SII follows using conditional expectations and Lemmas
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3.4 and 3.5. The expected value of the game ui at the running node xi can be
written in terms of the indices j1 and j2 as follows
ui = F0 + i ε, 0 ≤ i ≤ j1; (3.1)
ui =
j2 − i
j2 − j1
(F0 + j1 ε) +
i− j1
j2 − j1
(
Fn+1 + (n+ 1− j2) ε
)
, j1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ j2 − 1;
(3.2)
ui = Fn+1 + (n+ 1− i) ε, j2 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1, (3.3)
where (3.1) and (3.3) follow from Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5 respectively.
At this point we can use the DPP, which in this case reads
ui = max
{
min {ui−1, ui+1}+ε,
1
2
(
min {ui−1, ui+1}+max {ui−1, ui+1}
)}
, (3.4)
to determine under which conditions on F0, Fn+1 and ε do expressions (3.1), (3.2),
and (3.3) yield the value of the game.
Remark 3.6. It is easy to check that formulas (3.1) and (3.3) satisfy the DPP
(3.4) in the interior nodes of their respective ranges, i.e. for 1 ≤ i ≤ j1 − 1 and
j2 + 1 ≤ i ≤ n respectively. On the other hand, for every j1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ j2 − 1 ,
expression (3.2) yields
max
{
min {ui−1, ui+1}+ ε,
1
2
(
min {ui−1, ui+1}+ max {ui−1, ui+1}
)}
= ui + max
{
ε− |Fn+1 − F0 + (n+ 1− j1 − j2)ε|
j2 − j1
, 0
}
.
Therefore, (3.2) will solve (3.4) if and only if∣∣Fn+1 − F0 + (n+ 1− j1 − j2)ε∣∣ ≥ ε(j2 − j1),
which can be rewritten as
Fn+1 − F0
ε
≤ 2j1 − (n+ 1) or
Fn+1 − F0
ε
≥ 2j2 − (n+ 1). (3.5)
Recall the three regions in the segment described above, i.e., (1), (2), and (3),
and notice that there are seven possible game situations resulting from combina-
tions of these. We are going to describe now how each of these game situations
will take place or not depending on the relations among F0, Fn+1 and ε.
(i) Only (1) takes place. In this case j1 = n.
Observe that the fact that Player II chooses to move from xn towards
x0 and not towards xn+1 implies that F0 + nε (Player I’s payoff at xn in
the situation we are considering) is no bigger than Fn+1 + ε (Player I’s
payoff at xn when Player II’s strategy at xn is to move towards xn+1).
This yields the necessary condition
n− 1 ≤ Fn+1 − F0
ε
. (3.6)
Moreover, it follows from Remark 3.6 that formula (3.1) satisfies the
DPP (3.4) for 1 ≤ i ≤ j1 − 1, so it only remains to check the conditions
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under which (3.4) is satisfied at xn. In fact,
min {un−1, un+1} = min
{
F0 + (n− 1)ε, Fn+1
}
= F0 + (n− 1)ε
by condition (3.6) and then
max
{
min {ui−1, ui+1}+ ε,
1
2
(
min {ui−1, ui+1}+ max {ui−1, ui+1}
)}
= max
{
F0 + nε,
1
2
(
F0 + (n− 1)ε+ Fn+1
)}
= un + max
{
0,
1
2
(
Fn+1 − F0 − (n+ 1)ε
)}
.
We conclude that (3.1) satisfies (3.4) at xn if and only if Fn+1 − F0 ≤
(n+ 1)ε, which we can write together with (3.6) as follows
n− 1 ≤ Fn+1 − F0
ε
≤ n+ 1. (3.7)
Observe that this situation corresponds to (b) in the statement of The-
orem 3.1.
(ii) Only (2) takes place, i.e. the Players play a classical random Tug-of-War.
This case corresponds to j1 = 0 and j2 = n+ 1.
Notice that according to Remark 3.6 expression (3.2) will solve (3.4) if
and only if condition (3.5) holds, which in this case amounts to
Fn+1 − F0
ε
≥ n+ 1. (3.8)
Observe that when Q > n + 1 this situation corresponds to (a) in the
statement of Theorem 3.1 and when Q = n+ 1 to the alternative strategy
with j = 0 in (b).
(iii) Only (3) takes place. In this case j2 = 1. However, this alternative is not
reasonable since Player II would get a better payoff moving towards x0 at
x1, a situation that will be covered in the next case.
(iv) Both (1) and (3) take place but not (2), i.e., Player I always lets Player II
decide the next move. This case corresponds to j2 = j1 + 1 ∈ [2, n].
In a similar way the reasoning in (i), observe that the fact that Player
II chooses to move from xj1 towards x0 and not towards xn+1 implies that
F0 + j1ε (Player I’s payoff at xj1 in the situation we are considering) is
no bigger than Fn+1 + (n− j1 + 1)ε (Player I’s payoff at xj1 when Player
II’s strategy at xj1 is to move towards xn+1). This yields the necessary
condition
2j1 − n− 1 ≤
Fn+1 − F0
ε
. (3.9)
Analogously, the fact that Player II chooses to move from xj1+1 towards
xn+1 and not towards x0 implies that Fn+1 +(n−j1)ε (Player I’s payoff at
xj1+1 in the situation we are considering) is no bigger than F0 + (j1 + 1)ε
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(Player I’s payoff at xj1+1 when Player II’s strategy at xj1+1 is to move
towards x0). This yields the necessary condition
Fn+1 − F0
ε
≤ 2j1 − n+ 1,
which we can write altogether with (3.9) as
2j1 − n− 1 ≤
Fn+1 − F0
ε
≤ 2j1 − n+ 1. (3.10)
Furthermore, it follows from Remark 3.6 that
ui =
{
F0 + i ε, for 1 ≤ i ≤ j1;
Fn+1 + (n+ 1− i) ε, for j1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
satisfies the DPP (3.4) for every i 6= j1, j1 + 1, so it only remains to check
(3.4) in those cases. We provide the details in the case j1, since the case j1+
1 follows similarly. In fact, condition (3.10) implies min {uj1−1, uj1+1} =
uj1−1 and max {uj1−1, uj1+1} = uj1+1 and then
max
{
min {uj1−1, uj1+1}+ ε,
1
2
(
min {uj1−1, uj1+1}+ max {uj1−1, uj1+1}
)}
= uj1 + max
{
0,
1
2
(
Fn+1 − F0 − (2j1 − n+ 1)ε
)}
= uj1 ,
again by condition (3.10).
Observe that this situation corresponds to (c) in the statement of The-
orem 3.1 with k = j1.
(v) Both (1) and (2) take place but not (3). In this case j1 ∈ [1, n − 1] and
j2 = n+ 1.
We can think about this situation as a classical random Tug-of-War
game played in a shorter segment with nodes xj1 , xj1+1, . . . , xn+1 and final
payoffs F0 + j1ε at xj1 and Fn+1 at xn+1. Then, we recall from (ii) that
condition (3.8) must hold, which in this case reads,
Fn+1 − (F0 + j1ε)
ε
≥ n− j1 + 1,
which amounts to (3.8) after simplification.
On the other hand, we can also reduce this situation to case (i) in a
shorter segment with nodes x0, x1, . . . , xj1 , xj1+1 and final payoffs F0 at
x0 and (
n− j1
n+ 1− j1
)(
F0 + j1 ε
)
+
Fn+1
n+ 1− j1
at xj1+1, see formula (3.2). We conclude from condition (3.7) that
(j1 − 1) ε ≤
(n− j1)(F0 + j1 ε) + Fn+1
n+ 1− j1
− F0 ≤ (j1 + 1) ε,
which reduces to
2j1 − n− 1 ≤
Fn+1 − F0
ε
≤ n+ 1,
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and in view of (3.8) yields
Fn+1 = F0 + (n+ 1)ε. (3.11)
Moreover, it can be easily checked that with this condition ui = F0 + i ε
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, which verifies the DPP (3.4). This situation corresponds
to (b) in the statement of Theorem 3.1, choosing j = j1.
(vi) Both (2) and (3) take place but not (1). In this case j1 = 0 and j2 ≤ n.
Arguing as in the previous cases, the fact that Player II chooses to move
from xj2 towards xn+1 and not towards x0 implies that Player I’s expected
payoff at xj2 in this situation, i.e. Fn+1 + (n+ 1− j2) ε is no bigger than
Player I’s expected payoff at xj2 when Player II’s strategy at xj2 is to
move towards x0, that is,
ε+
F0
j2
+
j2 − 1
j2
(
Fn+1 + (n+ 1− j2) ε
)
.
This relation yields the condition
Fn+1 − F0
ε
≤ 2j2 − n− 1. (3.12)
On the other hand, we can think about this situation as a classi-
cal random Tug-of-War game played in a shorter segment with nodes
x0, x1, . . . , xj2 and final payoffs F0 at x0 and Fn+1 + (n + 1 − j2) ε at
xj2 . Then, we recall from (ii) that condition (3.8) must hold, which in this
case reads,
Fn+1 − F0
ε
≥ 2j2 − n− 1.
This condition, altogether with (3.12) yields the necessary condition
Fn+1 = F0 + (2j2 − n− 1) ε. (3.13)
Then, it can be easily checked that
ui =
{
F0 + i ε, for 1 ≤ i ≤ j2 − 1;
Fn+1 + (n+ 1− i) ε, for j2 ≤ i ≤ n,
(3.14)
which verifies the DPP (3.4). Notice that this situation corresponds to (c)
in the statement of Theorem 3.1 with j = j1 = 0 and k = j2 − 1.
(vii) All three ranges (1), (2), and (3) take place. In this case 1 ≤ j1 ≤ j2−2 <
j2 ≤ n.
We can reduce this situation to case (v) in a shorter segment with
nodes x0, x1, . . . , xj2 and final payoffs F0 at x0 and Fn+1 +(n+1− j2) ε at
xj2 . Then, (3.11) yields condition (3.13) and ui is given by (3.14), which
verifies the DPP (3.4). This situation corresponds to (c) in the statement
of Theorem 3.1, where we have chosen j = j1 and k = j2 − 1.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
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xn3+1
xn2+1
x∗xn1+1
Figure 3. Game positions of the Y-game with multiple running nodes.
3.2. Star-shaped graphs. Now we study the Totalitarian Tug-of-War game in
a star-shaped graph consisting of an arbitrary number of (arbitrarily long) graph
segments glued together at a common endpoint. The simplest of these is the Y
graph resulting from gluing together three graph segments, see Figure 3. For
simplicity, we will denote by x∗ the node where all branches meet and by xni+1
the terminal node of each branch i = 1, 2, . . . k.
The key observation is that the game on a star-shaped graph can be reduced to
a game on a graph segment where we can apply Theorem 3.1. Furthermore, one
can obtain in at most k(k − 1)/2 steps the game value and strategies that realize
it for any given star-shaped graph as follows:
(1) We choose two terminal nodes xnI+1 and xnII+1 as goals for Player I and
II, respectively.
(2) Then, Theorem 3.1 yields the value of the game in all the nodes on the
graph segment connecting xnI+1 and xnII+1, in particular at x∗
(3) Once the value of the game at x∗ is known, Theorem 3.1 can be applied
to all remaining graph segments branching off x∗, taking x∗ as a terminal
node with terminal payoff u(x∗). As a result, the value of u at all remaining
nodes is obtained.
(4) Then, we check if the the function u thus obtained satisfies the DPP at
x∗. If so, it is the unique value of the game, and we have found a strategy
that realizes it via Theorem 3.1. If not, we go back to step (1), select a
different pair of terminal nodes and iterate until we find the value of the
game.
4. The Relation Between the Totalitarian Tug-of-War
and Jensen’s Extremal Equations
In this section we are going to clarify the relation between the Totalitarian Tug-
of-War and Jensen’s extremal equations (1.7) and (1.8), see [10]. More precisely, in
this section we are going to consider a Totalitarian Tug-of-War played in Ω ⊂ Rn,
where the players can move the game token from y ∈ Ω to any position x ∈ Bε(y),
with ε > 0 a parameter fixed at the beginning of the game. In this case, the
payment that Player I receives from Player II when the latter is forced to choose
the new game position is proportional to the step size ε, with proportionality
constant λ. Without loss of generality, we will consider λ = 1 in the sequel.
As before, considering the two possible choices for Player I and then applying
conditional probabilities for the coin toss we obtain the Dynamic Programming
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Principle associated to this game, i.e.,
uε(x) = max
{
inf
y∈Bε(x)∩Ω
uε(y) + ε,
1
2
(
sup
y∈Bε(x)∩Ω
uε(y) + inf
y∈Bε(x)∩Ω
uε(y)
)}
for all x ∈ Ω. This can be equivalently written as
min
{
uε(x)− inf
y∈Bε(x)∩Ω
uε(y)− ε,
uε(x)−
1
2
(
sup
y∈Bε(x)∩Ω
uε(y) + inf
y∈Bε(x)∩Ω
uε(y)
)}
= 0
(4.1)
for all x ∈ Ω. For simplicity, we denote G[uε](x) = 0 with
G[uε](x) = min
{
uε(x)− inf
y∈Bε(x)∩Ω
uε(y)− ε,
uε(x)−
1
2
(
sup
y∈Bε(x)∩Ω
uε(y) + inf
y∈Bε(x)∩Ω
uε(y)
)}
.
(4.2)
The Dirichlet problem that results from the combination of (4.1) and the ter-
minal boundary payoff given by a bounded function F : ∂Ω→ R, corresponds to{
G[uε](x) = 0, x ∈ Ω;
uε(x) = F (x), x ∈ ∂Ω.
(4.3)
Then we have the following result.
Proposition 4.1. Let uε be the solution of (4.3). Assume that there exists a
function u such that uε → u uniformly in Ω as ε → 0. Then, u is a viscosity
solution to {
min
{
|∇u| − 1,−∆N∞u
}
= 0, in Ω;
u = F, on ∂Ω.
(4.4)
Remark 4.2. Considering a Totalitarian Tug-of-War which favors Player II instead
of Player I, we can treat (1.8) in a similar way, with equation (4.1) replaced by
max
{
uε(x)− sup
y∈Bε(x)∩Ω
uε(y) + λ ε,
uε(x)−
1
2
(
sup
y∈Bε(x)∩Ω
uε(y) + inf
y∈Bε(x)∩Ω
uε(y)
)}
= 0.
Remark 4.3. We would like to point out an interesting connection with the nu-
merical analysis of equations (1.7) and (1.8). More precisely, equations (1.7) and
(1.8) can be respectively approximated by the following schemes
min
{
1
ε
(
u(x)− inf
y∈Bε(x)∩Ω
u(y)− ελ
)
,
1
ε2
(
2u(x)− sup
y∈Bε(x)∩Ω
u(y)− inf
y∈Bε(x)∩Ω
u(y)
)}
= 0
(4.5)
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and
max
{
1
ε
(
u(x)− sup
y∈Bε(x)∩Ω
u(y) + ελ
)
,
1
ε2
(
2u(x)− sup
y∈Bε(x)∩Ω
u(y)− inf
y∈Bε(x)∩Ω
u(y)
)}
= 0,
(4.6)
which are discrete elliptic in the sense of [15] (and, therefore, monotone in the sense
of [2]) Furthermore, in a similar way to the Taylor expansion arguments in the
proof of Proposition 4.1, one can show that schemes (4.5) and (4.6) are consistent
(see [2, Section 2] for the definition). This means, roughly speaking, that the
finite-difference operator converges in the viscosity sense towards the continuous
operator of the PDE as ε → 0. Monotonicity and consistency, altogether with
stability are important requirements for convergence, as established in the seminal
paper [2]. Informally, the authors in [2] proved that any monotone, stable, and
consistent scheme converges provided that the limiting equation satisfies a type
of comparison principle known as “strong uniqueness property”, which is usually
difficult to prove. It seems an interesting question to tackle the convergence of
schemes (4.5) and (4.6) and their numerical implementation but we will not discuss
it here.
We include next for the reader’s convenience the definition of viscosity solution
for equation (4.4).
Definition 4.4. A viscosity subsolution of the equation (4.3) in Ω is an upper
semicontinuous function u : Ω→ R such that
min
{
|∇ϕ(x̂)| − 1,−∆N∞ϕ(x̂)
}
≤ 0, (4.7)
whenever x̂ ∈ Ω and ϕ ∈ C2(Ω) are such that u(x̂) = ϕ(x̂) and u(x) ≤ ϕ(x), for
all x in a neighborhood of x̂ (in other words, ϕ touches u at x̂ from above in a
neighborhood of x̂, or equivalently, u− ϕ has a local maximum at x̂).
Similarly, a viscosity supersolution of (4.3) in Ω is a lower semicontinuous func-
tion u : Ω→ R such that
min
{
|∇φ(x̂)| − 1,−∆N∞φ(x̂)
}
≥ 0, (4.8)
whenever x̂ ∈ Ω and φ ∈ C2(Ω) are such that u(x̂) = φ(x̂) and u(x) ≥ φ(x), for
all x in a neighborhood of x̂ (in other words, φ touches u at x̂ from below in a
neighborhood of x̂, or equivalently, u− φ has a local minimum at x̂).
Finally, a function u : Ω→ R is a viscosity solution of (4.3) in Ω if it is both a
viscosity subsolution and viscosity supersolution.
The following lemma, which relies on uniform convergence, is needed in the
proof of Proposition 4.1. A proof for continuous functions can be found in [14,
Lemma 4.5], but that version does not apply in our case because uε are not con-
tinuous in general.
Lemma 4.5. Let u = limε→0 uε uniformly in Ω ⊂ Rn, x̂ ∈ Ω and ϕ ∈ C2(Ω)
such that u(x̂) = ϕ(x̂) and u(x) < ϕ(x) for all x in a neighborhood U of x̂, when
x 6= x̂ (in other words, ϕ touches u at x̂ strictly from above in U , or equivalently,
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u−ϕ has a strict maximum at x̂ in U). Then, for any given ηε > 0 there exists a
sequence of points {xε}ε ⊂ U satisfying x̂ = limε→0 xε such that
uε(x)− ϕ(x) ≤ uε(xε)− ϕ(xε) + ηε for all x ∈ U . (4.9)
Moreover, whenever φ ∈ C2(Ω) touches u at x̂ strictly from below in U , for any
given ηε > 0 there is a sequence of points {xε}ε ⊂ U satisfying x̂ = limε→0 xε, such
that
uε(x)− φ(x) ≥ uε(xε)− φ(xε)− ηε for all x ∈ U . (4.10)
Proof. Let Br(x̂) be a fixed, small ball and write uε − ϕ = (uε − u) + (u − ϕ).
Since uε → u, we have that
sup
U\Br(x̂)
(uε − ϕ) ≤ sup
U\Br(x̂)
(uε − u) + sup
U\Br(x̂)
(u− ϕ)
≤ 1
2
sup
U\Br(x̂)
(u− ϕ) < 0,
for ε small enough. Moreover, for ε < εr small enough
sup
U\Br(x̂)
(uε − ϕ) < uε(x̂)− ϕ(x̂)
because the right-hand side approaches zero as ε→ 0 while the left-hand side has
a strictly negative limit. Notice that this means the value of uε − ϕ at the center
is larger than the supremum over U\Br(x̂). Therefore, there is a point xε ∈ Br(x̂)
such that
sup
U
(uε − ϕ) ≤ uε(xε)− ϕ(xε) + ηε
when ε < εr. The proof finishes by letting r → 0 via a sequence, say r = 1, 12 ,
1
3 , . . .
Hence, there is a sequence of points xε → x̂ which satisfy (4.9), as desired. The
proof of the supersolution case follows similarly. 
We are now in position to prove Proposition 4.1.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. 1. We will show first that u is a viscosity supersolution
of (4.3). Let x̂ ∈ Ω and φ ∈ C2(Ω) such that φ touches u at x̂ strictly from below
in a neighborhood of x̂. Our goal is to prove that
min
{
|∇φ(x̂)| − 1,−∆N∞φ(x̂)
}
≥ 0. (4.11)
Lemma 4.5 holds with ηε = ε
3 and we know there exists a sequence of points
xε → x̂ such that (4.10) holds. Rearranging terms we deduce
φ(xε)− max
Bε(xε)
φ+ ε3 ≥ uε(xε)− sup
Bε(xε)
uε (4.12)
and
φ(xε)− min
Bε(xε)
φ+ ε3 ≥ uε(xε)− inf
Bε(xε)
uε. (4.13)
2. We deduce from (4.1), that
uε(x)− inf
Bε(x)
uε − ε ≥ 0 and uε(x)−
1
2
(
sup
Bε(x)
uε + inf
Bε(x)
uε
)
≥ 0
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with equality in at least one of the two equations. From the first one and (4.13),
we get
φ(xε)− min
Bε(xε)
φ+ ε3 ≥ uε(xε)− inf
Bε(xε)
uε ≥ ε. (4.14)
Let us show that |∇φ(x̂)| ≥ 1. Assume to the contrary that |∇φ(x̂)| < 1 and
write minBε(xε) φ = φ(xε − εvε) for some vε ∈ B1(0). Then, a first-order Taylor
expansion yields
1
ε
(
φ(xε)− min
Bε(xε)
φ
)
= ∇φ(xε) · vε + o(1) ≤ |∇φ(xε)|+ o(1) < 1 (4.15)
for ε small enough, a contradiction with (4.14).
3. Let xminε , x
max
ε ∈ Bε(xε) be such that φ(xminε ) = minBε(xε) φ and φ(x
max
ε ) =
maxBε(xε) φ, respectively. We can show that
xminε = xε − ε
[
∇φ(xε)
|∇φ(xε)|
+ o(1)
]
as ε→ 0, (4.16)
and
xmaxε = xε + ε
[
∇φ(xε)
|∇φ(xε)|
+ o(1)
]
as ε→ 0. (4.17)
We will provide the details of the proof of (4.16) because (4.17) follows similarly.
First, notice that xminε ∈ ∂Bε(xε). To see this, assume to the contrary that
there exists a subsequence xminεk ∈ Bεk(xεk) of minimum points of φ in Ω. Then
∇φ(xminεk ) = 0 and since limεk→0 x
min
εk
= x̂, the continuity of φ implies that
∇φ(x̂) = 0, a contradiction.
Then, we can write xminε = xε − ε v for |v| = 1, and let ω be any fixed direction
with |ω| = 1. Since φ(xminε ) ≤ φ(xε− ε ω), a Taylor expansion of φ around xε gives
φ(xε)− ε 〈∇φ(xε), v〉+ o(ε) = φ(xminε ) ≤ φ(xε − ε ω) as ε→ 0,
or equivalently,
〈∇φ(xε), v〉+ o(1) ≥
−φ(xε − ε ω) + φ(xε)
ε
= 〈∇φ(xε), ω〉+ o(1) as ε→ 0.
Since the previous argument holds for any direction ω, we can conclude that
v =
∇φ(xε)
|∇φ(xε)|
+ o(1) as ε→ 0.
and the proof of (4.16) is complete.
4. Now, assume
uε(x)−
1
2
(
sup
Bε(x)
uε + inf
Bε(x)
uε
)
≥ 0.
Adding (4.12) and (4.13), and using this last inequality yields
φ(xε)−
1
2
(
max
Bε(xε)
φ+ min
Bε(xε)
φ
)
+ ε3
≥ uε(xε)−
1
2
(
sup
Bε(xε)
uε + inf
Bε(xε)
uε
)
≥ 0.
(4.18)
TOTALITARIAN RANDOM TUG-OF-WAR GAMES IN GRAPHS 23
On the other hand, let x̃minε = 2xε − xminε be the symmetric point of xminε with
respect to xε. Then,
φ(x̃minε ) + φ(x
min
ε )− 2φ(xε) ≤ max
Bε(xε)
φ+ min
Bε(xε)
φ− 2φ(xε),
and a second-order Taylor expansion of φ around xε, gives
max
Bε(xε)
φ+ min
Bε(xε)
φ− 2φ(xε)
≥
〈
D2φ(xε) (x
min
ε − xε),
(
xminε − xε
)〉
+ o(ε2) as ε→ 0.
(4.19)
Then, the combination of (4.18), (4.19), and (4.16) gives us
−ε2
〈
D2φ(xε)
∇φ(xε)
|∇φ(xε)|
,
∇φ(xε)
|∇φ(xε)|
〉
≥ o(ε2) as ε→ 0.
Dividing by ε2 and taking ε→ 0 we get −∆N∞φ(x̂) ≥ 0, and the proof of (4.11) is
complete.
5. The proof that u is a viscosity subsolution to (4.3), is similar to the superso-
lution case. Let x̂ ∈ Ω and ϕ ∈ C2(Ω) such that ϕ touches u at x̂ strictly from
above in a neighborhood of x̂. Our goal is to prove
min
{
|∇ϕ(x̂)| − 1,−∆N∞ϕ(x̂)
}
≤ 0. (4.20)
Just as in the subsolution case, Lemma 4.5 holds with ηε = ε
3 and we have that
there exists a sequence of points xε → x̂ such that (4.9) holds. Rearranging terms
we deduce
ϕ(xε)− max
Bε(xε)
ϕ− ε3 ≤ uε(xε)− sup
Bε(xε)
uε (4.21)
and
ϕ(xε)− min
Bε(xε)
ϕ− ε3 ≤ uε(xε)− inf
Bε(xε)
uε. (4.22)
6. Notice that we can assume |∇ϕ(x̂)| > 1 since otherwise (4.20) holds and the
proof is complete. In particular, ∇ϕ(xε) 6= 0 for ε small enough and we can prove
(4.16) and (4.17) just as before.
Moreover, (4.22), (4.16) and a Taylor expansion give
1
ε
(
uε(xε)− inf
Bε(xε)
uε
)
≥ 1
ε
(
ϕ(xε)− min
Bε(xε)
ϕ− ε3
)
= |∇ϕ(xε)|+ o(1) > 1
for ε small enough. Therefore, taking into account (4.1), we deduce that
uε(xε)−
1
2
(
sup
Bε(xε)
uε + inf
Bε(xε)
uε
)
= 0
and, adding (4.21) and (4.22), we obtain
ϕ(xε)−
1
2
(
max
Bε(xε)
ϕ+ min
Bε(xε)
ϕ
)
− ε3
≤ uε(xε)−
1
2
(
sup
Bε(xε)
uε + inf
Bε(xε)
uε
)
= 0.
(4.23)
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Now, consider the point x̃maxε = 2xε − xmaxε , the symmetric point of xmaxε with
respect to xε. The second-order Taylor expansion of ϕ around xε evaluated at
xmaxε and x̃
max
ε yields,
max
Bε(xε)
ϕ+ min
Bε(xε)
ϕ− 2ϕ(xε) ≤ ϕ (xmaxε ) + ϕ (x̃maxε )− 2ϕ(xε)
=
〈
D2ϕ(xε) (x
max
ε − xε), (xmaxε − xε)
〉
+ o
(
ε2
)
as ε→ 0.
(4.24)
The combination of (4.17), (4.23), and (4.24) gives us
−ε2
〈
D2ϕ(xε)
∇ϕ(xε)
|∇ϕ(xε)|
,
∇ϕ(xε)
|∇ϕ(xε)|
〉
≤ o
(
ε2
)
as ε→ 0.
After dividing by ε2 and taking ε → 0 we get −∆N∞ϕ(x̂) ≤ 0 and (4.20) holds as
desired. 
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